The Time Has Come for an International Criminal Court

M. Chertf Bassiouni* Introduction
The end of the "Cold War" presents an historic opportunity to advance the international rule of law by establishing an international criminal court to preserve peace, advance the protection of human rights and reduce international and transnational criminality.
The idea for such a court is not new and the efforts to establish it have increased over the years. All of the precedents, however, have been ad hoc international tribunals which ceased to exist when the specific function or purpose for which they were designed ended. But the important legal fact is that they existed, albeit with all the weaknesses and shortcomings of having been hastily established, created for a single adjudicating purpose and temporary in nature. Nevertheless, these precedents are the backdrop of international experience which must now ripen into a permanent international adjudicating structure designed to apply international criminal law with consistency and objectivity, and by means of fair process.
Historical Background
It can be said that the first international criminal court was established in 1474 in Breisach, Germany, where 27 judges of the Holy Roman Empire judged and condemned Peter von Hagenbach for his violations of the "laws of God and man" because he allowed his troops to rape and kill innocent civilians and pillage their property.' Since then, a number of similar precedents have taken place and moreover, a number of initiatives for a permanent international criminal court have been developed. (See Appendix I for the chronology of these initiatives.) -After World War I, the Treaty of Versailles provided for the prosecution of Kaiser Wilhelm 112 and for an international tribunal to try German war criminals. 3 After the war, the Kaiser fled to the Netherlands where he obtained refuge, but the Allies, who had no genuine interest in prosecuting him, abandoned the idea of an international court. 4 Instead, they allowed the German Supreme Court sitting at Leipzig to prosecute a few German officers. 5 The Germans criticized the proceedings because they were only directed against them and did not apply to Allied personnel who also committed war crimes. More troublesome, however, was the Allies' failure to pursue the killing of a then estimated 600,000 Armenians in Turkey. 6 The 1919 Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties for Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, which investigated the responsibility of those who violated the laws of war, recommended the prosecution of responsible Turkish officials and by doing so, the notion of "crimes against humanity" became a legal reality. 7 Strange as it may seem today, the United States, at that time, opposed such prosecution on the technical legal argument that no such crime yet existed under positive international law. 8 Consequently, the -Treaty of S~vres (1923) , which was to serve as a basis for Turkish prosecutions, was never ratified, 9 and its replacement, the Treaty of "crimes against the laws of humanity" in the post-World War I era as prosecutable and punishable international crimes came back to haunt the very same Allies, and particularly the United States, after World War II. -In 1937, the League of Nations adopted a Convention Against Terrorism. The Protocol to this Convention contained a Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal; however, India was the only country to ratify it and the Convention never entered into effect. 1 2 Since then, the world has been plagued with all sorts of terror-violence, producing significant victimization, and as a consequence, a number of international Conventions on the subject have been adopted but none contained a provision for the establishment of an international criminal court as did the 1937 Convention. 1 3 Once again the short-sightedness of public officials prevented the taking of that additional step which many felt to be necessary. 4 -After World War II, the Allies established two international tribunals -at Nuremberg" 5 and Tokyo 16 -to try major war criminals; however, the absence of a strong precedent in the post-World War I era weakened the legality of the process. Even worse was the absence of prosecution of Allied military personnel for war crimes. These and subsequent prosecutions became tainted with the claim of "victor's vengeance," although the legitimacy of prosecuting such offenders by far outweighed the legal weaknesses of the process and certainly outweighed nonprosecution. Subsequent to Nuremberg and Tokyo, the Allies established war crimes tribunals in their respective zones of occupation in Germany and tried over 20,000 war criminals. 1 7 Germany then took over the task of prosecuting offenders found in its territory. 8 Formerly occupied countries of Europe also prosecuted Germans and their own nationals who collaborated with the occupiers. In some countries, the process continues. Suffice it to recall: Israel's Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 1 9 under which there were two landmark "Green Series." For an account of the trial and the accused, see E. DAVIDSON the General Assembly ever since. -In 1972, the Apartheid Convention provided for the establishment of an international criminal jurisdiction. 3 4 In 1980, at the request of the Commission on Human Rights, I prepared a draft statute for an international criminal tribunal to prosecute apartheid violators, but the project thus far has not been acted upon. Statute was discussed at a meeting convened by Senator Arlen Specter:
But, the ILC is not the only forum for discussion of this proposal. Commencing later [sic] month in Italy, the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences in cooperation with the United Nations Crime Prevention Branch on Penal Codes will focus primary attention on the issue of creation of an international criminal court. And, in August, the United Nations' 8th Congress on Crime Prevention will also focus debate on the creation of such a court. Clearly, the progress made on the need for and creation of international criminal court has taken a quantum leap forward.
In sum, it is clear that there is broad agreement on the definition and threat posed by drugs and drug trafficking leading to the United Nations adoption on December 20, 1988 of the Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. In spite of several international conventions on aviation, maritime safety and hostage-taking, there is less agreement on the definition of terrorism. While both represent a very serious problem to safety and security, the development of a regional international criminal court focusing on drugs and international drug trafficking, in my view, offers a start in establishing and developing the international criminal court system. In closing, I wish to support the effort of the forthcoming fora in their efforts to create an international criminal court. In the months ahead I shall be introducing a new legislative proposal to move the United States closer to a more active role in the formulation of an international criminal court.
Mr. President, I would be gravely remiss if I did not recognize the extensive scholarship contributed by Cherif Bassiouni, professor of law at DePaul University College of Law to the development of an international criminal court and code. Professor Bassiouni's counsel and dedication have been a source of inspiration and guidance to this Senator and indeed to the community of international criminal lawyers and scholars. His competence and vision as an international criminal law scholar are universally shared. I thank him publicly for his contributions and leadership in this matter and look forward to greater cooperation with him in the formulative period ahead.
136 CoNG. REC. S8080 (daily ed. June 18, 1990) (statement of Sen. Specter).
And also, after the Siracusa Conference: with minor changes and the text was submitted to the Eighth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders held in Havana, Cuba, August-September, 1990. 3 
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-The Eighth Congress debated the subject and that discussion was summarized in its report as follows:
There was a need to develop clear ideas and a firm attitude on international co-operation, free of isolationism while respecting the sovereignty of States. Some delegations considered that the threat of major international crimes necessitated the establishment of an international criminal court. It would serve as an instrument for the defence of international peace and security, without which the sovereignty of some States, particularly small States, could be placed in jeopardy.
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The Congress, however, resolved as follows:
The International Law Commission should be encouraged to continue to explore the possibility of establishing an international criminal court or some other international mechanism to have jurisdiction over persons who have committed offences (including offences connected with terrorism or with illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances), in accordance with General Assembly resolution 44/39 of 4 December 1989. Similarly, and in the light of the report that the International Law Commission will submit on this particular subject to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session, the possibility might be considered of establishing an international criminal court or appropriate mechanism with each and all of the procedural and substantive arrangements that might guarantee both its effective operation and absolute respect for the sovereignty and the territorial and political integrity of States and the self-determination of peoples. States [Vol. 1: 1 could also explore the possibility of establishing separate international criminal courts of regional or sub-regional jurisdiction in which grave international crimes, and particularly terrorism, could be brought to trial and the incorporation of such courts within the United Nations system. 4 0 -In July 1990, the International Law Commission completed a report and submitted it to the 1990 session of the General Assembly. 4 1 It expressed a positive view on the feasibility of such a court with jurisdiction over "Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.
Report of the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
All these efforts have brought us closer to realizing the expectations of so many who believe that some form of international adjudication for international and transnational crimes may be forthcoming. But so far the political will of the world's major powers has been lacking, and progress toward that goal is slow though growing.
Political, Practical and Technical Legal Considerations
The obstacles to the establishment of an international criminal court fall essentially into three categories: (1) political; (2) practical; and, (3) legal-technical. Of these three, the political factor is the most significant, followed by the practical one, while the legal-technical one does not pose any serious difficulties.
The political factor stems essentially from objections generated by those who adhere to a rigid conception of sovereignty, even though such conceptions have been dipassi in so many other areas of international law, particularly with respect to the international and regional protections of human rights embodied in conventional and customary international law. The real opposition, however, comes from government officials who fear two types of situations.
The first is the risk that they and other senior officials, especially heads of state, can be called to answer for their acts which may constitute international violations and which .would be subject to the Court's jurisdiction. This is not surprising in view of the fact that the Nuremberg 43 and Tokyo 4 international military tribunals, and the United Nations' 43. See supra note 15. 44 . See supra note 16. subsequent affirmation of the Nuremberg principles, removed the immunity of heads of states and negated other defenses, such as "obedience to superior orders." 4 5 Since World War II a number of instances have come to world public attention indicating that heads of state and senior government officials have engaged in or supported the commission of such international crimes as aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, apartheid, slavery and slave-related practices, international trafficking in drugs, aircraft hijacking, kidnapping of diplomats, taking of civilian hostages and torture. And while the world community expresses abhorrence of some of these crimes, and outrage about others, little if anything is done, other than pious denunciations, and occasionally, some condemnatory resolutions by the United Nations and other international bodies.
The political problem is obvious. Heads of states and senior government officials have historically wanted to shield themselves from any form of international accountability. Their successors and even their opponents so frequently cover up for them for fear that they too may find themselves in a similar situation, or because they feel that domestic political peace may warrant it. This was evident when Bangladesh did not carry out its intended prosecution of Pakistanian military personnel after the independence of that region, which was once part of Pakistan.4 6 It was also the case when Argentina, after prosecuting some officers for the estimated 15,000 desaparecidos between 1976-1983, passed an amnesty law on December 29, 1990.4 7 During the "cold war" (1948-1989) countries on both sides of the then "iron curtain" perceived the exigencies of national security at precluding consideration of an international criminal court that would deal with such international crimes as aggression and terrorism. But the real reason was that the two superpowers engaged in acts violating international criminal law, as did their surrogates, satellites and respective friendly countries. Exaggerated as these claims of national [Vol. 1: 1 security were, and certainly as they now appear to be, the argument of national security was frequently used to rationalize the commission of international crimes ranging from aggression to torture. Even now, public officials in countries which resort to, or allow torture, rationalize it on the grounds of national security or public necessity. 4 Strange as it may seem, the efforts of public officials to shield themselves from accountability, whether heads of state or. simple police officers, has consistently been the same for as long as there is a record of these occurrences. They invariably argue that their action was necessary in order to protect or save the nation, or to advance its vital or national security interests. Another argument advanced against such a court, as well as another risk perceived by public officials, is the apprehension that an international adjudication body can, for purely political reasons, embarrass governments and public officials. But surely sufficient safeguards could be developed to prevent such possibilities, much as certain mechanisms have been developed in domestic legal systems to avoid abuse of power through prosecutorial misconduct and abuse of prosecutorial discretion. Such issues as well as other legal-technical issues cannot be raised a -priori to oppose the realization of the idea. They are valid concerns to be raised in the context of drafting the norms and provisions of an international criminal court system so as to develop appropriate safeguards. It is, therefore, more likely that this argument is raised in order to obfuscate the fact that the former one (to shield public officials) is the real reason for the opposition to the idea.
Practical questions are also raised with frequency and have a ring of authenticity to them, particularly to the non-initiated. Among these questions are: where to locate the Court; how to secure the presence of the accused to stand trial; how to select judges, etc. These and other practical questions are no different than those which faced the drafters of the 1899 Hague Convention establishing the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 49 
1991]
political sensitivities about all forms of international adjudication are similar. That is why both the PCIJ and the ICJ provide for the MemberStates the choice of compulsory or voluntary submission to jurisdiction. 0 In the case of an international criminal court having jurisdiction over individuals, it would seem that these political sensitivities should be of a lesser nature, except, of course, when it comes to prosecuting public officials for crimes having political overtones or which are committed pursuant to state-policy and particularly if the international criminal court were to have exclusive jurisdiction.
The Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal, which I prepared in 1980 and which was revised and reviewed by the 1990 Siracusa Committee of Experts and then submitted to the Eighth United Nations Congress, 51 addresses these concerns without compromising the basic values and goals sought to be achieved by such a Tribunal. Clearly, other solutions to practical and legal technical questions can be developed, but the point is that these problems are not as difficult to resolve as some government officials claim. They are not, therefore, a valid reason for the refusal of establishing an international criminal court.
Legal-technical issues are easily resolvable and many thoughtful models have been developed by the League of Nations, the United Nations, non-governmental organizations and individual scholars.
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(Some of these questions are discussed below when the "Proposed Model" is examined.)
Recent Developments
In the last three years, the question of establishing an international criminal court has emerged at the highest political levels in the world and renewed interest has been expressed by world leaders and by the United Nations. 5 3 As early as 1987, President Gorbachev expressed support for such a court, but with jurisdiction limited to terrorism. 5 4 In the United As for the Bush Administration, it has stressed international cooperation against terrorism and trafficking in drugs, but it seems, at this point, reluctant to support an international court to prosecute such offenders. 63 The establishment Of an international criminal court with jurisdiction to prosecute and punish individuals and entities who engage in, inter alia, the illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs across national borders would serve to bolster the legal process whereby such offenders are prosecuted and punished and would also contribute substantially to the progressive development and codification of international law.
With regard to Columbia, as Senator Specter notes in the Congressional Record:
Colombia is a vivid case in point. Extraditions to the United States have had some positive effect on traffickers. But, these same extraditions represent a serious political problem for the leadership of Colombia. Thus, in his August 7, 1990, Inauguration address, President Cesar Oaviria Trujillo vowed to "explore the possibility of creating an international or regional criminal jurisdiction to fight narco-trafficking and other related crimes that surpass international borders." 136 CoNG. REc. S18160 (daily ed. October 25, 1990).
66. The fnter-American Juridical Committee of the OAS at its 1990 session, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (see document OEA/Ser. G, CP/doc.2113/90, Nov. 7, 1990, page 53). The motion to examine this topic was presented by the Argentine member of the Committee, Dr. Jorge R. Vanossi, who was subsequently appointed rapporteur together with Professor M. Vieira from Uruguay. In his introductory statement, Dr. Vanossi made reference to the work undertaken by the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, and to the preparatory work submitted by Dr. Bassiouni (see 1990 Session of the Inter-American Juridical Committee, August 18 meeting, Minute No. 12). These documents will be an important source for the Committee, which is expected to begin examination of the topic at the 1991 JulyAugust session. This information was provided by Ambassador Hugo Caminos, Assistant Secretary General for Legal Affairs, who is following this question at the OAS.
[Vol. 1: 1 court with universal jurisdiction to prosecute all or most of the 22 categories of international crimes covered by conventional and customary international law, including, but not limited to: 67 aggression (crimes against peace); war crimes; crimes against humanity; genocide; apartheid; slavery and slave-related practices; torture; unlawful human experimentation; piracy; hijacking and sabotaging of aircraft; kidnapping of diplomats and other internationally protected persons; taking of hostages; and, criminal damage to the environment. The International Law Commission has taken such a position in its 1990 Report to the General Assembly, though the list of international crimes it has developed is different from the one proposed above by this writer. 6 A The ILC's 1990 position on such a Court is stated as follows:
Competence of the Court (a) Jurisdiction limited to the crimes mentioned in the Code or jurisdiction as to all international crimes? (i) Versions submitted
On this topic, the Special Rapporteur submits the following versions:
Version A: There is established an International Criminal Court to try natural persons accused of crimes referred to in the draft Code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind. 
See the International Law Commission's latest report (from its Forty-First
1991)
(ii) Commentaty 6. The question is whether international criminal jurisdiction will be limited to the crimes referred to in the draft Code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind, or whether it will also encompass other international crimes which do not fall within that category. As is well known, the Code does not cover all international crimes. Among those not mentioned therein are the dissemination of false or distorted news, or false documents, by persons knowing that they will have an adverse effect on international relations; insults to a foreign State; the counterfeiting of currency; practiced by one State to the detriment of another State, and the theft of national or archaeological treasures; the destruction of submarine cables; international trafficking in obscene publications, etc.
7. Accordingly; the concept of an international crime is broader than that of a crime against the peace and security of mankind; it covers a wider field which includes all other international crimes in addition to those defined in the draft Code.
8. The question, therefore, is whether the jurisdiction of the Court is limited to crimes against the peace and security of mankind, or whether the Court will deal with all international crimes.
9.
It would seem preferable to confer the broadest possible jurisdiction upon the Court; otherwise, it would be necessary to establish two international criminal jurisdictions, which would lead to complications.
(b) Necessity or non-necessity of the agreement of other States (i) Versions submitted
Version A: No person shall be tried before the Court unless jurisdiction has been conferred upon the Court by the State in which the crime was committed, or by the State of which such person is a national, or by the State against which the crime was directed, or of which the victims were nationals. (ii) Commentayy 11. Version A is based on article 27 of the draft statute prepared by the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction. 6 9 Is it appropriate? From the legal point of view, nothing prohibits a State from punishing crimes against its own security, even if such crimes are committed abroad by foreigners. Moreover, in the vast majority of cases, this solution would lead to requesting the consent of Governments guilty of having organized or tolerated criminal acts.
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Such a court is not only possible, it is quite feasible. All of the foreseeable problems and difficulties have been thoughtfully dealt with by a number of experts who have prepared detailed studies and examined alternative solutions to the various legal and practical questions. to consider the "Espacio Judiciario Andino. " ' These approaches substitute expanded regional criminal jurisdiction for the idea of regional or international adjudicating bodies. Thus, national criminal courts and national structures of administration of criminal justice would remain competent but they would be able to act even when the crime was not committed within their territory. In fact, these schemes are not really designed to expand the adjudication system, but they are a subterfuge for allowing law enforcement agencies, now limited by territorial jurisdiction, to operate outside it. These approaches, while strengthening law enforcement, do not accomplish the many goals of international or regional adjudication, and consequently, should not be regarded as valid alternatives. In addition, these schemes are fraught with dangers to procedural safeguards on the extra-territorial activities of law enforcement.
The establishment of an international criminal court, whether universal or regional, can be based on exclusive jurisdiction for certain crimes or on concurrent or alternative jurisdiction with that of the state having criminal jurisdiction. The jurisdictional mechanisms are, of course, to be established by the treaty-statute.
The establishment of an international criminal court could admittedly be based on various models including, but not limited to: 
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Tribunal's procedural rules would incorporate international human rights standards of due process and assure uniformity of procedural treatment of all persons. The application of the substantive law of the state where the offence was committed is fair, and would assuage any exacerbated feelings of sovereignty that such a state may have in allowing the Tribunal to prosecute those accused of committing crimes in their territory.] 4. Conviction a. Upon conviction, the individual may be returned to the surrendering state, which will carry out the sentence on the basis of provisions in the Convention, which would be in the nature of "transfer of prisoners" agreements. 79 Alternatively, the convicted person can be transferred to any other State-Party on Mount. Appropriate as that is, no one who views human rights as universal can fail to note that the same measure was not resolved for Iraqi violations -or, for that matter, for other more serious ones. Lest one forgets, 1.5 million people have been killed by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, with muted condemnation by powers quick to condemn Israel and now Iraq. We must not have different scales to weigh human-rights violations, scales dependent upon who the violator or the victim may be. The tragic incidents in the Middle East can be an opportunity to enhance human-rights protections by serving as an impetus to the establishment of an impartial, permanent fact-finding commission. The time has come to do something more than express selective verbal condemnations. There would be at least four Chambers of three judges each and a Presiding Judge. The judges would be drawn by lot and sit in rotation on the various chambers. b. One of the chambers would act as the Inquiry Chamber while the other chambers would be adjudicating chambers.
Appeal
To provide for the right of appeal, the Tribunal sitting en banc with a panel of nine judges would hear appeals excluding those judges who decided the merits of the case.
Selection of Judges
Each State-Party would appoint a judge from the ranks of its judiciary or from distinguished members of the bar or from 
Rules of the Tribunal
The Tribunal would be authorized to enact rules of practice and procedures before it.
Standing Committee of State-Parties
The State-Parties would hold an annual conference to review the Tribunal's work and the Convention for purposes of amending it whenever needed and to ensue full compliance by the State-Parties.
The Organs of the Tribunal
These organs shall consist of:
The Court
1.
The Court shall consist of twelve judges, no more than two of whom shall be of the same nationality, who shall be elected by the Standing Committee of States-Parties from nominations submitted thereto.
2. Nominees for positions as judges shall be of distinguished experts in the fields of international criminal law or human rights and other jurists qualified to serve on the highest courts of their respective states who may be of any nationality or have no nationality.
3.
Judges shall be elected by secret ballot and the Standing Committee of States-Parties shall strive to elect persons representing diverse backgrounds and experience with due regard to representation of the major legal and cultural systems of the world.
4. Elections shall be coordinated by the Secretariat under the supervision of the presiding officer of the Standing Committee of States-Parties and shall be held whenever one or more vacancies exist on the Court.
5.
Judges shall be elected for the following terms: four judges for four-year terms, four judges for six-year terms, and four judges for eight-year terms. Judges may be re-elected for any term at any time available.
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6. No judge shall perform any public function in any state.
7.
Judges shall have no other occupation or business than that of judge of this Court. However, judges may engage in scholarly activity for remuneration provided such activity in no way interferes with their impartiality and appearance of impartiality.
8.
A judge shall perform no function in the Tribunal with respect to any matter in which he may have had any involvement prior to his election to this Court.
9.
A judge may withdraw from any matter at his discretion, or be excused by a two-thirds majority of the judges of the Court for reasons of conflict of interest.
10.
Any judge who is unable or unwilling to continue to perform functions under this statute may resign. A judge may be removed for incapacity to fulfill his functions by a unanimous vote of the other judges of the Court.
11.
Except with respect to judges who have been removed, judges may continue in office beyond their term until their replacements are prepared to assume the office and shall continue in office to complete work on any pending matter in which they were involved even beyond their term.
12. The judges of the Court shall elect a president, vicepresident and such other officers as they deem appropriate. The president shall serve for a term of two years. 14. The salary of judges shall be equal to that of the judges of the International Court of Justice.
15. The Court en banc shall, subject to the provisions of this Statute, adopt rules governing procedures before its chambers and the Court en banc, and provide for establishment and rotation of chambers.
16.
The Court en banc shall announce its decisions orally in full or in summary, accompanied by written findings of fact and conclusions of law at the time of the oral decision or within thirty days thereafter, and any judge so desiring may issue a concurring or dissenting opinion.
17.
Decisions and orders of the Court en banc are effective upon certification of the written opinion by the Secretariat, which is to communicate such certified opinion to parties forthwith.
18.
The Court en banc may, within thirty days of the certification of the judgment, enter its decisions without notice. 3. The Procurator's salary shall be the same as that of the judges.
No actions taken
4. The deputy procurators and all other members of the Procurator's staff shall be named and removed by the Procurator at will.
The Secretariat 
5.
The Secretariat staff shall be appointed and removed by the Secretary at will.
6. An annual summary of investigations undertaken by the Procuracy shall be presented to the Secretariat for publication, but certain investigations may be omitted where secrecy is necessary, provided that a confidential report of the investigation is made to the Court and to the Standing Committee and filed separately with the Secretariat. Either the Court or the Standing Committee may order by majority vote that the report be made public.
The Standing Committee international cooperation for the prevention and control of international and transnational criminality. If the United States and the Soviet Union can accept mutual verification of nuclear arms controls, then surely they and other countries can accept a tribunal to prosecute not only drug traffickers and terrorists, but also those whose actions constitute such international crimes as aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity and torture.
Many of the international crimes for which the Court would have jurisdiction are the logical extension of international protection of human rights." Without enforcement, these rights are violated with impunity. We owe it to the victims of these crimes and to our own human and intellectual integrity to reassert the values we believe in by at least attempting to prosecute such offenders. When such a process is institutionalized, it can operate impartially and fairly. We cannot rely on the sporadic episodes of the victorious prosecuting the defeated and then dismantle these ad hoc structures as we did with the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. The permanency of an international criminal tribunal acting impartially and fairly irrespective of whom the accused may be is the best policy for the advancement of the international rule of law and for the prevention and control of international and transnational criminality.
An international criminal court will surely be established one day. In the meantime, however, we will have to remain with the bitter realization that, if it had existed earlier, it could have deterred certain people and thus prevented some victimization. The conscience of world leaders should be bothered by this prospect, especially when they oppose the idea on the basis that it might infringe on jealously guarded notions of sovereignty.
Justice it would be "useful" to "push ahead with an international tribunal for the trial of these kinds of international criminals [terrorists] ." Secretary Schultz replies that "it may be an important possibility," and notes that "over a period of years now more and more usefulness of the rule of law in getting at terrorism and drug trafficking."
1988: Senator Specter includes a provision in the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act calling on the President to pursue negotiations to establish an international criminal court with jurisdiction over international drug trafficking. 18 June 1990: Floor Statement by Senator Specter. Specter describes a symposium held at his request to discuss the creation of an international criminal court. At the 10 May 1990 symposium chaired by Professor M.C. Bassiouni, 13 international criminal law scholars and government officials joined by Congressmen Bob Kastenmeier and Jim Leach, expressed a consensus that "a regional international criminal court of limited scope and powers had the potential for making a significant contribution in the area of narcotics trafficking and should be further explored." Specter includes in the Congressional Record a copy of the written consensus drafted at the symposium. Kimmitt states that the Leach and Specter proposals would be "enormously complex" undertakings, noting, for instance, that if the State Department wanted to go forward on these proposals, it would have to come to the Senate for advice and consent first. Still, Kimmitt expresses "no disagreement at all" on the mechanism and the principle involved in the Leach proposal. He adds, in fact, that he would like to bring in lawyers in other agencies and departments who are working right now on the Gulf situation. Kimmitt concludes that 'the time is probably riper than ever to look closely at that situation." (international criminal jurisdiction). 
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